Indiana Law Journal
Volume 12

Issue 1

Article 11

10-1936

Judgment-Civil Action for Perjury as Collateral Attack

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Civil Law Commons

Recommended Citation
(1936) "Judgment-Civil Action for Perjury as Collateral Attack," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 12 : Iss. 1 ,
Article 11.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol12/iss1/11

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

RECENT CASE NOTES
prohibits stock investments when, by reason of the merits of the individual
case, such investments should be permitted; and the Massachusetts rule permits stock investments when, by reason of the merits of the individual case,
such investments should be prohibited before they are made. In order to
obviate the objections to either of the aforementioned rules, and benefit by the
value each rule possesses, it would seem the trustee should be permitted to
invest in stocks of private corporations only by first obtaining a court order,
and permission should be granted only when the court is satisfied that the
corporation in whose stocks the trust funds are to be invested has successfully
withstood the test of time and the scrutiny of an accurate financial examination. In Indiana the situation appears to have been that stock investments
were, as a matter of law, improper, but that the trustee was relieved of
liability if he was granted the permission of the court to invest in stocks.21
However theoretical the distinction may be, it seems only reasonable that
where permission to invest in stocks is given by the court, not only should
the trustee be relieved of liability in case of loss, but the investment should be
recognized in the first instance as a legal and proper one. An Indiana statute
authorizes investment of trust funds in personal property when permission is
granted by the court, and under this statute stock investments can now be
2
regarded as legal when the court's consent has first been obtained. 2 It is
submitted that the Indiana statute recognizes and adequately meets the
dilemma of the trustee when faced with the problem of investing trust funds
in stocks of private corporations. The statute applies only to banks and trust
23
companies, but private trustees may be treated on the same footing.
H. B.

JunGmENT-CiviL ACTioN FOR PERJURY AS COLLATERAL ATrAcK.-Appellant
previously had sued appellee Pope alleging damage of $12,500 due to personal
injuries caused by appellee's negligence. Appellee, Jobes, a physician, was
called by Pope as an expert defense witness and testified that appllant's
injuries were simulated ones. There was a verdict for Pope. In the instant
complaint, appellant joined the physician, the prior defendant Pope, and an
indemnity insurer as defendants and alleged that defendants had conspired
to make a false and malicious defense to the prior personal injury action
through perjured testimony and that the testimony of appellee Jobes was
false, thus damaging appellant to the extent of $12,500. Separate demurrers
by appellees for insufficient facts were sustained. Appellant refused to plead
further. Held, to permit the maintenance of an action for damages against
an adverse witness dn the ground that a previous defeat in a tribunal of
competent jurisdiction was due to false testimony, would be sanctioning
1
collateral attack on judgments and lead to endless litigation.
The instant case presents two problems: (1) Can a civil action for perjury
be maintained? (2) If not, what relief is available to a party under these
circumstances, assuming his allegations to be provable? Added to the first
21 Indiana Trust Co. v. Griffith (1911), 176 Ind. 643, 95 N. E. 573, 575.
22
Burns (1933), sec. 18-1204.
23 Freifield, Investment of Trust Funds, 5 Cin. L Rev. (1931), 1, at
26 and 51.
1 Hermon v. Jobes (1935), 198 N. E. 316 (Ind. Sup.).
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question is whether such action may be maintained under an allegation of
conspiracy to use perjured testimony.
In Indiana, as in the great majority of states, no action lies to recover
3
damages caused by perjury. 2 The same is true of subornation of perjury.
But when this action is linked with a charge of conspiracy, it loses its simplicity and confronts apparently conflicting doctrines. On the one hand are
such statements as are found in Verplank v. V7an Buren,4 "The false testimony
is not the sole moving factor in the action. The fraudulent purpose or intent,
and the false entries in the
formed before the accounting and trial,
books of account are the chief basis of the cause of action. The acts of the
defendants upon the trial are but a part of an entire transaction." Under
such reasoning, the court there allowed recovery on the ground of a conspiracy to defraud even though the final acts were false testimonies at a
trial. On the other hand are the cases which hold that what one may do
5
lawfully alone, two or more may lawfully agree to do jointly. . On analysis,
however, the conflict resolves itself. There must be tortious conduct by at
lease one of the conspirators, or none will be liable.6 The facts of the Verplank case show one of the defendants to be guilty of the tort of deceit and
thus the conspirators were jointly liable. Although procuring a judgment
through perjured testimony may be fraudulent, the absolute immunity of a
7
witness from civil liability therefor precludes any tortious act.
It is submitted that the principal case is in accord with the almost unanimous weight of authority in denying a cause of action for damages under
these facts. A prior judgment cannot be so impeached and the policy against
subjecting parties and witnesses to such further litigation is obvious. So long
as the former judgment stands, it is conclusive as to the facts and law
therein decided.8 This implies, and the instant opinion suggests, that the
appellant's remedy would be a direct action to set aside the judgment, since
9
But just how is this
it is, in effect, alleged to have been procured by fraud.
to be done? Even where an equitable action to set aside a judgment for fraud
is still used, the great majority of cases hold that perjury is not grounds for
10
Nor is it sufficient "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
equitable relief.
2 Grove v. Bradenburg (1844), 7 Blackf. 234, Godette v. Gaskill (1909),
151 N. C. 52, 65 S. E. 612, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 265, Stevens v. Rowe (1880),
59 N. H. 578, Cunningham v. Brown (1846), 18 Vt. 123, Shaub v. O'Ferrall
(1911), 116 Md. 131, 81 At. 789, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 416.
3 Young v. Leach (1898), 27 App. Div. 293, 50 N. Y. S. 670; Peck v. Woodbridge (1808), 3 Day (Conn.) 30; Taylor v. Bidwell (1884), 65 Cal. 489,
4 Pac. 491.
4 (1879), 76 N. Y. 24-7. Discussed in principal case.
5
Rowan v. Butler (1908), 171 Ind. 28, 85 N. E. 714-; Kimbal v. Harmon
(1871), 34 Md. 407, Page v. Parker (1861), 43 N. H. 363, DeWulf v. Dix
(1900), 110 Ia. 553, 81 N. W 779.
6Harper, Law of Torts, (1933) sec. 302.
7 Harper, Law of Torts (1933), sec. 9. "Privilege affords an immunity
from liability for the legal consequences of conduct which, but for the privilege, would be tortious."
S Shultz v. Shultz (1894), 136 Ind. 323, 36 N. E. 126, Horner v. Schinstock
(1909), 80 Kan. 136, 101 Pac. 996, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 134-.
9 For a discussion of distinctions made between intrinsic and extrinsic
fraud, see Freeman, Judgments (5th ed.), Vol. 3, secs. 1225 and 1233.
10 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed.), Vol. 3, sec. 1241, Hitt v. Carr (1921),
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Again, that the false testimony was procured by a conexcusable neglect." 1
12
Thus, any proceeding to
spiracy does not aid the appellant's position.
vacate the judgment as suggested by the court is also closed to the appellant,
so long as the fraud involved consisted of false testimony. Unless appellant
had taken advantage of a proper objection and ruling thereon which could
have been the basis of a motion for a new trial 1 3 to the lower court, it is
further submitted that he has foregone the only remedy he had if false
testimony was used and he was unable properly to impeach the witness at
the trial.1 4 Oddly enough, when the state institutes prosecution for perjury
or other misconduct in procuring a judgment, it is not a collateral attack, since
it is said the validity of the judgment is entirely unquestioned and unaffected. 15
H. A. A.
77 Ind. App. 488, 130 N. E. 1, Pepin v. Lautman (1901), 28 Ind. App. 74,
62 N. E. 60.
11Burns' Ann. St. 1933, sec. 2-1068, Freeman, Judgments (5th ed.), Vol. 1,
sec. 235; Pepin v. Lautman (1901), 28 Ind. App. 74, 62 N. E. 60.
12 Freeman Judgments (5th ed.), Vol. 3, p. 2585; Pepin v. Lautman (1901),
28 Ind. App. 74, 62 N. E. 60; Nesson v. Gilson (1916), 224 Mass. 212, 112
N. E. 870. Cf. Nugent v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. (1899), 46 App. Div. 105,
61 N. Y. S. 476.
13 Burns' Ann. St. 1933, sec. 2-2401.
14 If he did not discover the perjury until after the 30 day period for a
motion for a new trial had expired, Burns' Ann. St. 1933, sec. 2-2405 may still
give a remedy upon complaint filed not later than the second term after the
discovery of the specification for a motion for a new trial.
15 Freeman, Judgments (5th ed.), Vol. 1, p. 606, United States v. Bradford, 148 Fed. 413.
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